American Withdrawal: The View from Manbij

american withdrawal: the view from manbij

Earlier this month, as the Trump Administration announced that the United States would withdraw its troops from northern Syria, Turkey and Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army factions launched an assault on the area, attacking the border towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ein. Subsequently, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the predominantly Kurdish militia that had been backed by the U.S. since 2015, looked to an alternative partner that would protect them from Turkish forces. In a deal with the Syrian regime that was sponsored by Russia, the SDF agreed to allow Bashar al-Assad’s forces to enter a 95-kilometer-long strip adjacent to the Turkish border, between the cities of Manbij and Kobani. In return, the Syrian regime would help the SDF prevent the FSA from attempting a take-over of Manbij. However, just a week later, the deal now looks to be an opening for the regime take over the city itself.

Regime Control in the Manbij Countryside

On October 13th, regime forces entered Manbij from the sub-district of al-Arima in the western suburbs—the first time since the regime entered the city since it was expelled in July 2012. Manbij has a strategic location as the gateway to the Euphrates region, and is home to about 200,000 people, which includes many internally displaced Syrians. The regime did not stay in the city; instead, they and the Russians conducted joint patrols in the northwestern countryside, adjacent to FSA controlled areas. Soon after, regime forces spread to twenty-three other villages in the Manbij countryside, from al-Jat village in the east all the way to al-Arima to the west.

In response, two days later, the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the Free Army announced the battle to capture Manbij city. The battle began from four directions, and after two hours, the FSA was able to capture three villages west of Manbij. But four hours after the start of the operation, the factions halted their advancement at Turkey’s request.

As events accelerated, the American forces started to withdraw from their bases in Aun al-Dadat village north of the city, al-Asaliah northwest of the city, and al-Sadiya in the western suburbs. Within hours of their departure, regime forces stationed themselves at the strategic crossing near Tishrin Dam, east of the city, and more regime reinforcements began to arrive in western Manbij, adjacent to where FSA-controlled villages.

Background to Regime – SDF Cooperation: The Arima Deal

This isn’t the first time the SDF has been compelled to turn to the regime for support. In March 2017, Turkish-backed forces were marching towards Manbij from the northwest. Through the U.S. was backing the SDF, it refused to intervene in this to protect their allies, because these areas were located outside the range of the Coalition’s geographic purview. As a result, the SDF turned to the regime; the deal, sponsored by Russia, stipulated that SDF would facilitate the passage of petroleum convoys to regime-controlled areas, in exchange for the regime’s support in stopping the march of FSA forces. This resulted in the creation of joint checkpoints between the regime and the SDF in the sub-district of Arima and its villages. Two Russian bases were established in the area as well.

Tightening the Noose Around Manbij City

The current deal between the SDF and the regime allows Assad to exert a greater presence in an area he’d been unable to recapture for five years. On October 16th, American forces withdrew from the Qaraquzaq bridge, spanning the Euphrates river, which gave the regime and the Russian the opportunity to expand further east of the Euphrates, passing through Manbij to Kobani and Tabqa. There appears to have been an informal understanding between the Turks, the Russians, and the Americans to allow the spread of regime forces in the area spanning from al-Jat to al-Arima, which is considered the closest point to the city, in order to stop the potential waves of migration waves that would result from a regime takeover of the city. The regime forces are effectively closing off areas north and west of the city to the residents of Manbij. The area south of the city is also under the control of the regime, which is stationed about 25km way from the city. The east is closed at the moment, because of the fighting that is taking place over there, and because the regime has captured some strategic roads. Just outside the city, the Assad regime has stationed three regime personnel in each of the checkpoints east and west of Manbij city, in order to facilitate the passage of their troop columns The city itself is not under regime control--not yet, at least.

Beyond a military show of force, the regime is also trying to intensify its political presence in and around Manbij. Last week, a Syrian and Russian media delegation visited downtown Manbij in order to organize rallies in support of the regime forces. The SDF soon dispersed the crowds from the public square and in front of the Military Council Headquarter located near the Flour Mills Roundabout south of the city. Furthermore, the regime tried to pressure the SDF to raise the regime flag in the city center and on top of government insinuations, which the SDF so far has refused to do. Similarly, on October 16th, it asked to open centers to reconcile with opposition activists, as it has done in other areas it has reconquered. This, too, the SDF has thus far rejected. As a result, the regime started shifting its strategy. At first, an SDF escort would lead a Russian and Syrian police patrol up the al-Arima road, located to the west of the city, to the village of Aun al-Dalat, to its north. Now, however, in order to convince the public that it has taken control over Manbij, its patrols are passing through the city on their way to Aun al-Dadat. In addition, the regime is trying to win hearts and minds through employees of its institutions (such as bread and electricity) who have been present in the city for the last few years. These individuals are trying to persuade their friends and neighbors that the regime’s takeover would be a welcome development.

A City of Fear

Caught between the advancements of Turkey and the FSA on the one side, and the regime and Russia on the other, the civilians of Manbij are living in a state of panic and fear for what may happen. The city is home to those who defected from the regime’s military as well as those who were previously with the FSA. At the same time, there are a large number of youths who have lost their trust in the FSA; The rebels had promised that if the regime entered the city, they would invade in order to liberate them. They kept repeating this promise, through their media outlets, but have done nothing.

A complete regime take-over of Manbij will be a disaster—thousands of people will be displaced while revolutionary activists will oppose any regime presence. Just this week, activists called for and successfully carried out a general strike against the regime—hundreds of stores across the city remained closed for the day.

To add more complexity to the matter: some members of the Manbij Military Council, a the governing authority here, are blacklisted by the regime themselves, and they will likely also act to prevent the regime from advancing even further. It’s possible that, in order to keep the Assad forces from gaining more territory, we may see new deals or agreements in the near future between FSA and SDF. This may be our only hope. Otherwise, without a new agreement or pressure from Russia, the regime is unlikely to withdraw.

List of villages in the Manbij Countryside Now With a Regime Presence:

Al-Jat, Oun al-Dadat, Tukhar, Qratah, Arab Hasan, al-Muhsenli, al-Farat, Um Adasah, al-Saiyadah, al-Asaliya, Waridah, Um Jlud, al-Dandaniah, al-Helwanji, al-Jamusiah, al- Qarat, Yaran, Kaukli, Korhiok, al-Buyahji, al-Bughazi, Jablah al-Hamra, al-Yashli, and Aozari.

List of villages of al-Arima included in the 2017 SDF – Regime Deal:

Qarat, Yaran, Kaukli, Korhiok, al-Buyahji, al-Bughazi, Jablah al-Hamra, al-Yashli, and Aozari.

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